Syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes are attractive to arti cial intelligence researchers. But results of Montague 12] and Thomason 16] seem to show that syntactical treatments are not viable. They show that if representation languages are su ciently expressive, then axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief give rise to paradox. De Rivi eres and Levesque 6] characterized a class of sentences within which these schemes can safely be instantiated. These sentences do not quantify over the propositional objects of knowledge and belief. We argue that their solution is incomplete, and extend it by characterizing a more inclusive class of sentences over which the axiom schemes can safely range. Our sentences do quantify over propositional objects.
The syntactical view has seemed attractive to researchers in arti cial intelligence (see chapters 2 and 8 of 5] ). For one thing, it is natural to represent the knowledge and beliefs of a computer program by writing sentences representing facts that are known or believed. For another, syntactical treatments can be formalized in the classical predicate calculus, which is the lingua franca of knowledge representation 9, 13, 14] ; since there is good theorem-proving technology for this language (e.g. 1{3]), such treatments lend themselves directly to implementations. Attractive as they may be, though, syntactical treatments face a serious theoretical di culty. As we shall see, Richard Montague 12] shows that if the language in which known facts are represented is su ciently expressive, then familiar axiom schemes characterizing knowledge are inconsistent. He argues that knowledge can be given a syntactical treatment only on pain of triviality. Richmond Thomason 16] argues under similar assumptions that a syntactical treatment also trivializes belief.
Montague and Thomason obtain their limiting results by instantiating their axiom schemes with self-referential formulas. In response, Jim de Rivi eres and Hector Levesque 6] show that syntactical treatments are viable if these axiom schemes are instantiated only with what they call regular formulas. This result is a good start. But syntactical treatments will be more useful if it can be extended, since regular formulas are rather restricted in their expressive power. For one thing, they do not quantify over the sentences that, on a syntactical treatment, are the propositional objects of the attitudes. Such quanti cation is needed to express matters that it may be useful for automated agent to know. To take just one example from natural language processing, it is widely recognized that participants in cooperative dialogue will say only what they believe to be true, and will make their conversational contributions as informative as possible 8] . That a speaker conforms to these maxims of conversation is naturally expressed, assuming a syntactical treatment, by quantifying over the sentences he utters. It is not expressed by any regular formula.
Our result, which extends that of de Rivi eres and Levesque, shows that such quanti cation does not pose a special problem for syntactical treatments. We show that the schemes of Montague and Thomason can without paradox be instantiated with formulas that quantify over the propositional objects of the attitudes. We shall proceed as follows. First, in section 2, we discuss the difculty with syntactical treatments of propositional attitudes. After introducing a language with self-reference, and the axiom schemes of Montague and Thomason, we reproduce their negative results. In section 3, we present the limited positive result of de Rivi eres and Levesque concerning regular formulas. We also show, by elaborating on the example from natural language processing, that it can be useful to instantiate the axiom schemes with formulas that quantify over propositional objects. In section 4, we show how to extend the result of section 3 to cover such formulas. Finally, in section 5, we present a further extension.
Knowledge and Belief
To bring out the di culties with syntactical treatments, the language for representing attitudes must have resources for self-reference. These are provided here by arithmetization. 1 We introduce the following language of arithmetic.
De nition 1 (The language of arithmetic) L 0 is a rst-order language which includes a set of individual variables (x; y; :::); a set of individual constants (a; b; c; c 1 ; c 2 ; :::) including the special constant symbol 0 (zero); a set of predicate symbols (P; R; :::) including the special unary predicate IN; and function symbols S (the successor function), + (addition) and (multiplication).
The terms and atomic formulas of L 0 are de ned in the usual way, as are the formulas formed with the connectives^, _, !, :, and quanti ers 9 and 8. In the following, we shall consider only languages which extend L 0 . The following de nition concerns what can be regarded as terms denoting formulas:
De nition 2 (G odel Numerals) Let L be a language and ' 2 L. Letting g(') be the G odel number of ' (according to some xed scheme), d'e is the L 0 -numeral g(')times z}|{ S::: 0.
We can regard d'e as a term standing for the formula '. Now the following de nition introduces the relation symbol with which we shall express propositional attitudes as relations to formulas.
De nition 3 (The language of the attitudes) L is the language whose vocabulary is that of L 0 , together with the special dyadic relation symbol . We shall refer to the formulas of L using lower case Greek letters: , , etc. Below, will represent either knowledge or belief. Thus, a (d'e) expresses that the agent a has attitude toward sentence '; just which attitude represents will be clear from the context. When we are not interested in them we shall suppress the agents, writing simply (d'e). 2 Now we can characterize knowledge and belief as follows:
Knowledge Axioms 1 Nothing depends essentially on this. The paradoxes discovered by Montague and Thomason and our responses to them can be discussed while obtaining self reference using other techniques. 2 In L we can, for example, write 8x(utter(speaker;x) ! speaker (x)). The intended interpretation of this sentence is that the speaker utters only what he believes to be true.
Interpreting (d'e) as the claim that the agent knows ', the following axiom scheme expresses the facticity that distinguishes knowledge from belief and other propositional attitudes:
Other schemes express that the agent knows certain things, and that its knowledge is closed under certain logical operations. Thus:
ii (d (d'e) ! 'e) expresses that the agent knows that what is known is true. The axiom scheme:
iii (d'e), for each ' that is a logically valid formula of the rst-order predicate calculus, expresses that the agent knows logic. Finally:
] expresses the assumption that the agent's knowledge is closed under modus ponens.
To facilitate the coming discussion, for any set S of formulas let K(S) be the set of all instantiations of schemes (i){(iv) with formulas ' and of S.
Belief Axioms
Interpreting (d'e) as the claim that the agent believes ', scheme (i) is unacceptable. Beliefs can be false. Belief is characterized by axiom schemes (ii)-(iv) above together, perhaps, with positive introspection:
This scheme expresses that the agent is cognizant of his own state of belief: if he believes something, then he believes that he believes it. Let B(S) be the set of all instantiations of schemes (ii)-(v) with formulas of S. With this background in place, we are in a position to see the di culty with syntactical treatments.
The di culty with syntactical treatments
Generalizing Tarski's 15] demonstration of the unde nability of truth, rst Montague 12] and then Thomason 16] proved results that seem to show that propositional attitudes can be given syntactical treatments only on pain of triviality. Let Thomason's result seems to show that someone who supposes arithmetic is true cannot suppose that an agent believes arithmetic, without supposing that the agent is perfectly credulous. He must suppose that such an agent believes everything, if belief is given a syntactical treatment.
The upshot for knowledge representation is that, on a syntactical treatment of propositional attitudes, one cannot add to a knowledge base all instantiations of axiom schemes (i){(iv), or of (ii)-(v). To do so will, under unobjectionable further assumptions, make the knowledge base inconsistent. Our response to these results will be to guarantee consistency by limiting the scope of the axiom schemes (i)-(v) . We shall allow them to be instantiated only within a limited part of the object language. That is, we shall characterize a somewhat limited set of unproblematic sentences, within which these schemes can safely be instantiated.
A Partial Solution
The rst response of this kind came from de Revi eres and Levesque 6] . They showed that the schemes characterizing knowledge and belief can safely range over what they called regular sentences. We shall in this section de ne this set and state their result. To this end, we shall rst slightly extend L . 3 If (w) is a monadic predicate, the relativization of ' to , ' , is de ned for arbitrary ' by recursion: if ' is atomic, ' is '; (:') is :' ; (' ! ) is ' ! , and so on; nally, replacing , if need be, by an alphabetic variant that does not contain the variable x, (8x') is 8x( fx=wg ! ' ) and (9x') is 9x( fx=wg^' ).
Re-de nition 1 (The language of the attitudes) We add to the earlier L , for each i > 1, a relation symbol i of arity i + 1. (We now write \ 1 " for \ .") Informally, one argument place is for the agent, one is for (the G odel numeral of) a formula, and the rest are for the parameters of the formula. The intended interpretation of i a is best illustrated by example: informally speaking, 1 user (ddeparture-time (train,3:15) e) means that the user believes that the train departs at 3:15. The intended interpretation of 9x 2 user (ddeparture-time(train,x)e; x) is that the user believes that the train departs at some time.
De nition 6 (Regular formulas) Let L be a rst-order language as dened above. Then the regular formulas, R, are the smallest subset of L such that: Thus, the problems discovered by Montague and Thomason arise if their axiom schemes are instantiated with all sentences of L , but they do not arise if these schemes are instantiated with just the regular sentences.
As far as it goes this result is very nice, but one might hope that it can be extended from the regular sentences to some more inclusive set. This is because quite straightforward matters cannot be expressed using regular sentences. Sentences that quantify over the propositional objects of knowledge and belief are a case in point. For example, to provide a query-answering system with the knowledge that the user believes that the system believes what the system says, we might wish to write in the knowledge base some sentence such as: user (d8x(utter(system; x) ! system (x)e): While the syntax of L allows us to write this sentence, though, as things stand there is no guarantee that the system will be able to use it to make desirable inferences. This is because the sentence 8x(utter(system;x) ! system (x)) quanti es over propo- 5 In this case we write`'(x 1 ; :::; x k )'.
sitional objects, and is therefore not regular. (ddeparture-time(train,3:15) e)e). Now, it can be seen that this sentence can be inferred from user (d8x(utter(system; x) ! system (x))e) together with the fact that the user believes that the system has uttered the sentence in question, user (dutter(system; ddeparture-time (train,3:15) e)e), provided the schemes of Thomason are instantiated in the system's knowledge base with a sentence of which 8x(utter(system; x) ! system (x)) is a subformula. (Which instantiations are needed is left as an exercise.) But the theorem of de Revi eres and Levesque o ers no guarantee that the necessary instantiations can be written in the knowledge base without introducing inconsistency.
In the following section 4 we characterize a set, more inclusive than the regular sentences, which includes sentences that quantify over propositional objects of knowledge and belief. Then we generalize Theorem 7,  showing that the schemes characterizing knowledge and belief can without paradox be instantiated within this set. This generalization, together with a further generalization in section 5, does guarantee that the instantiations needed for the above inference can consistently be written in a knowledge base.
A less partial solution
To begin we must once again slightly extend L . We add to L the new monadic predicate symbols T and P. Also, in addition to the variables x; x 1 ; x 2 ; :::; y; :::, we add a countable stock of new variables X; X 1 ; X 2 ; :::; Y; :::.
Intuitively speaking, the symbol P will pick out (the G odel numbers of) sentences of L ; T will pick out the true sentences. The following de nition concerns the promised set, to which we shall generalize Theorem 7.
De nition 8 (Regular formulas with Propositional Quanti cation (RPQ))
The RPQ formulas are the smallest set of L such that: (iv) If ' is an RPQ formula then 8X(P(X) ! ') and 9X(P(X)^') are also RPQ formulas, where X is a (new) variable.
It is easy to see that all regular formulas are RPQ. The RPQ part of L is more expressive than the regular part, though, since there are RPQ formulas that, intuitively speaking, quantify over propositional objects. For example:
8X(P(X) ! (utter(system; X) ! 2 system (dT(X)e; X))) is an RPQ representation of the claim, discussed in the previous section, that the system only says what it takes to be true. This sentence can be further embedded. Thus: 1 user (d8X(P(X) ! (utter(system; X) ! 2 system (dT(X)e; X)))e) is an RPQ representation of the claim that the user believes that the system does this. Again:
is an RPQ representation of the claim that there are among the user's beliefs some that are false. This too can be further embedded. Thus:
user (dT(X)e; X)^:T(X))e) represents the user's belief in his doxastic fallibility.
We shall now show that the axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief can safely be instantiated with RPQ sentences. and fQ IN g B(RPQ s ) ? . Theorem 9 extends Theorem 7 from the regular part of L to the more inclusive RPQ part of L . The upshot is that although according to Theorem 1 and 2 we cannot unrestrictedly instantiate axiom schemes (i)-(v) within a knowledge base, we can safely instantiate these schemes with RPQ formulas, which quantify over propositional objects. This is not sanctioned by de Revi eres and Levesque's earlier result. It allows an automated agent to reason about knowledge and belief in useful ways, as illustrated at the end of section 3. Notice that the consistent theory ? of theorem 4 can contain, besides instantiations of the axiom schemes with RPQ sentences, other sentences that are not RPQ. The point is not that the knowledge base should contain only RPQ sentences. It is just the instantiations of the axiom schemes that should be restricted.
We shall prove Theorem 9 by rst establishing a correspondence between the RPQ formulas and a language for second-order modal logic 7] . First, though, we need several more de nitions. The rst of these introduces the relevant modal language.
De nition 10 (The language of 2 with propositional quanti cation) We extend L 0 to a multi-modal language L 2 by adding, to the vocabulary of L 0 , for each individual constant a of L 0 , a modal operator 2 a . We also add the same new variables X; Y; ::: that we included in L . The atomic formulas of L 2 are just those of L 0 , together with the variables X; Y; :::. Complex formulas are formed using :,^, 2, 8x, 9x, 8X and 9X in the usual way. We shall refer to the formulas of L 2 by p; q; r etc. This is to distinguish them from those of L , to which we refer using '; ; etc. Examples of formulas of L 2 are: 2P(x), 8X8x(P(x)^X), 9X2X. We shall now turn to the interpretation of L 2 . Note, rst, that whereas X; Y; ::: in interpretations of L were allowed to range over the same domain as the variables x; y; :::, in interpretations of L 2 the variables X; Y; ::: will range over propositions. These will not be elements of the domain over which the variables x; y; ::: range. Instead they will be sets of possible worlds of the models within which we shall interpret L 2 . De nition 11 (Models of L 2 ) A model for L 2 is a tuple < W; R; ; I > where W is a non-empty set of possible worlds, R is a function assigning to each individual constant of L 0 a binary relation on W, and is an in nite domain of individuals. I is an interpretation function which provides each nonlogical symbol of L 2 with a suitable interpretation. Thus I associates with each world and individual constant of L 2 an element of , and with each world and relation symbol a suitable relation on .
We assume that the individual constants are rigid designators: for each v; w 2 W, I(w; c) = I(v; c). Therefore, we can simply write: \I(c)". We assume furthermore that for each a, R a is an equivalence relation. Thus, all of the L 2 models considered below are S5 models 4]. We now turn to the evaluation of formulas. A variable assignment h into a model < W; R; ; I > associates with each lower case variable an element of (i.e., h(x) 2 ), and with each upper case variable a set of possible worlds (i.e., h(X) W). 
{ X = T(X).
{ (p^q) = p ^q , (p _ q) = p _ q , (p ! q) = p ! q , (:p) = :p . { (8xp) = 8xp and (9xp) = 9xp . { (8Xp) = 8X(P(X) ! p ) and (9Xp) = 9X(P(X)^p ). { (2 a p(x 1 ; :::; x k ; X 1 ; :::; X l )) = k+l+1 a (dp e; x 1 ; :::; x k ; X 1 ; :::; X l ). Now, the RPQ formulas are just translations of formulas of L 2 : Lemma 14 ' 2 L is an RPQ formula i for some p 2 L 2 , ' = p .
Proof: Straightforward induction on the length of '.
To state the main lemma we use to prove Theorem 9, we rst de ne, for any variable assignment h into an L 2 model, an associated set of variable assignments into models of L .
De nition 15 (The variable assignments associated with h) Let , dp e ! dp e 2 Th(N). Finally, we show that (dQ IN e) ! (d0 = 1e) 6 2 Th(N) . This is a direct consequence of Lemma 16, together Our result can be extended to languages with modal operators other than 2, with modal conditional connectives such as that of Lewis 10] , and other constructions that can be analyzed within possible-worlds models. In the following section, we shall extend it instead to a larger fragment of the same language L .
An Extension
In the previous sections we characterized sentences that are well behaved, in the sense that the axiom schemes corresponding to knowledge and belief can without paradox range over them. Regular sentences are well-behaved in this sense and so are RPQ sentences. But these characterizations are partial, insofar as there are more inclusive sets of sentences within which these schemes can safely be instantiated. In this section we shall extend Theorem 9 to one such set. The e ect is to extend even further the range of sentences with which axiom schemes (i){(v) can be instantiated within a knowledge base.
One motivation for this extension is that useful inferences appear to rely on instantiating the schemes of Montague and Thomason with certain sentences that are not RPQ. For example, the inference discussed at the end of section 3 relies on instantiating with 2 (dT(X)e; ddeparture-time (train,3:15) (dT(X)e; dp e) 2 E, but 2 (dT(X)e; dp e) 6 2 RPQ. We shall now extend Theorem 9 to E, showing that the axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief can safely be instantiated with E sentences.
Theorem 21 (i) 
We have: N j = 1 (d e) , (by De nition of I) for some q 2 L 2 such that 2 q e , M; w j = 2q , for some q 2 L 2 such that 2 q e , M; w j = 2X X=kqk M ] , (g(T(X)); g( )) 2 I( 2 ) , N j = 2 (dT(X)e; d e). Thus, to show that M; w j = 2q () 8 2 q e N j = to be true' or`There are among the user's beliefs some that are false'.
We have stated the problems discovered by Montague and Thomason. We have presented the solution of de Rivi eres and Levesque. We have argued that their solution is incomplete. Finally, we have extended it by characterizing a more inclusive class of sentences over which the axiom schemes characterizing knowledge and belief can safely range. This more inclusive class of sentences includes representations of our example sentences.
We expect that this result can be further extended, allowing the schemes to range over more sentences, though in the light of Theorems 1 and 2 there is a limit to what can be done. Maybe in a partial logical setting, within which self-referential sentences can be allowed to go without truth values, the axiom schemes can be allowed to range over the entire language. But this is not possible in the classical setting that has seemed attractive to researchers in arti cial intelligence.
